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# Foreign Policy in Dialogue

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## State-Building and Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: Europe's Engagements Twelve Years after Dayton

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# Foreign Policy in Dialogue

**A Quarterly Newsletter on German and European Foreign Policy**

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The project is presently headed by Marco Overhaus. Current staff members are Jan Vogel, Christine Prokopf, Milena Anna Jurca, Peter Klassmann and Christine Schuster.
Overall responsibility for the project lies with Prof. Hanns W. Maull.

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# I. State-Building and Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: Europe's Engagements Twelve Years after Dayton

## Editorial

*By Marco Overhaus*

In the course of the 1990s, the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia was one important catalyst for the European Union's determination finally to become a serious political actor in international affairs and to take onto itself the task to create a "Europe whole and free". Developments in the Western Balkans displayed the exact opposite of everything which Europe aspired to: nationalism instead of Europeanism, violence instead of peace and intolerance instead of mutual comprehension and cooperation. This is why the region has not only posed a security problem to Europe, but has challenged the European project at its core.
Twelve years after the Dayton accords terminated the Bosnian civil war, the records are mixed. Genocide and war were halted in Bosnia and Kosovo while another ethnic war could be prevented in Macedonia. Among the former members of the Yugoslav Federation, one has already become a member of the European Union (Slovenia), while another is well on its way towards accession (Croatia). On the other side of the balance sheet, ethnicity, with its heavy baggage of mutual mistrust and power-politics, has remained the dominant policy factor in most countries of the region. Political and economic reforms are stagnating in many parts, especially in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia.

2007 and 2008 may turn out to be decisive years for the region. In December 2007, the international community and the parties involved are due to find a solution to the unresolved question of Kosovo's future international status. As of today, the positions of Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians are irreconcilable. The Albanian government in Pristina seems to be heading towards a unilateral declaration of independence even without Serbian agreement – an outcome which could ignite further bitterness in Belgrade and split the European Union. The looming decision over Kosovo also has already contributed to rising tensions in Bosnia. In 2008, the international Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe – since 1998 the central coordination forum for the EU's engagement in the Balkans – is due to transfer its competences and activities to a new body under regional ownership. Whether or not this process will be successful will also depend on the developments in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Against this background, this issue of *Foreign Policy in Dialogue* is dedicated to a stock-taking of the European and international engagements in the Western Balkans at this critical juncture. The central question raised in this volume - as well as in the wider political and scientific debate – is to what extent the Western Balkans has really begun to move beyond the "Dayton Agenda", which has focused on *coexistence* along ethnic lines, towards the "European Agenda" of cooperation and integration across ethnic lines. While the former agenda has mainly rested on external pressure, the latter will depend on support and dedication from the regional actors themselves.

*Bjoern Kuehne*, who is Head of Cabinet in the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, starts with an altogether positive assessment of the Pact's achievements in the region. Crucially, he sees the Pact's alleged weakness, namely that it was not endowed with its own substantial funds and did not become a permanent organization, as its true strength. Only this constellation allowed it to become a neutral forum for practical cooperation among the stakeholders and involved countries even when, at the political level, this cooperation would have been difficult or even impossible. Kuehne cites Kosovo's involvement in regional cooperation as an important example. While he also acknowledges setbacks and failures in the Pact's stated goals, especially as regards the overblown expectations which it nourished itself, he sees it well on its way towards the successful transferral of competences to the regional actors in 2008.

*Dušan Reljić* considers the membership perspective and the related Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) as the potentially most powerful tools of the European Union to induce far-reaching political, economic and societal reforms in the Balkan countries. Even though the EU reiterated this perspective at its Thessaloniki summit in June 2003, Reljić criticizes that it has recently begun to neglect this powerful tool as a result of *enlargement fatique*. According to the author, the "Turkish clause", which was inserted into the French constitution by former President Jacques Chirac, obliging the government to put any new accession to the EU (except Croatia) to a popular vote, is one of the principal symptoms of this *fatigue*. Reljić urges the EU to overcome this *fatigue*, and in particular to increase its financial commitment to the region.

*Vedran Dzihic* examines Europe's state-building efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo. He starts by analyzing why both entities have lagged behind the region in terms of democracy and sustainable economic development. He sees the specific challenge of a "triple transition"

(from war to peace, from humanitarian aid to self-supporting economic development, and from socialist political systems to democracy and free-market economies) as the crucial factor. Yet, he also criticizes the EU's "formal-technical" approach to democratization in Bosnia and Kosovo which, according to him, privileges the dominant ethnic groups and "makes it much more difficult for the ethnic and other minorities to realise their rights." *En lieu* of this formalistic approach, Dzihic pleads for a broader concept of democratization which places more emphasis on the people as such (irrespective of their ethnical background). In contrast to Bosnia and Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has often been regarded as a model case for external preventive engagement. As *Veton Latifi* points out, when inter-ethnic tensions there began to rise in 2001, the international community successfully applied three important lessons it had learnt from its failure to stop the outbreak of war in Bosnia and in Kosovo to the crisis in Macedonia: 1) it reacted in a timely manner, 2) it has since then relied primarily on political instruments and 3) it has developed a coherent transatlantic approach. While Macedonia has all the ingredients to become a model case for multi-ethnic state-building (demographic diversity, social and economic balance and a new constitution), however, Latifi argues that Macedonia has so far failed to actually perform this role. The main reason, he argues, is that the country's elites have so far resisted accepting the reform agendas foreseen by the Ohrid Framework Agreement as well as by the European Union.

Finally, *Marco Overhaus* analyzes how the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union has been closely intertwined with the crises in the Western Balkans. He identifies Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) as one of the most important issues in this relatively new and dynamic policy field of the EU. While the Union does not lack in ambition to become a unique security actor through its ability to integrate civilian, economic and military tools in crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, the reality has displayed a considerable gap between those ambitions and real capabilities. Still, Overhaus argues that the EU has narrowed this gap, not least by learning from experience on the ground in Bosnia, developing pragmatic *ad hoc* solutions and institutional innovations at the operational level, rather than by *grand institutional design*. The new Lisbon Treaty of the European Union is unlikely to change this pattern significantly.

It is hardly surprising that the contributions to this volume draw a mixed picture of success and failure of the European and international engagements in the Western Balkans. Yet there are two themes which all the contributions seem to share. The first is that, unfortunately, the

Dayton agenda is far from being accomplished: ethnic conflict and precarious state institutions in this region continue to pose serious risks which need to be dealt with. Even though the EU has increasingly focused on global political and security problems – such as terrorism and the spread of deadly weapons – the true challenge remains in Europe itself. The second theme is that the European Union has to strike a difficult balance between a renewed and robust engagement in the Western Balkans and the need to make reform efforts locally self-supporting. In the end, it is the people of the region themselves who hold the key to their future.

## From the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to the Regional Cooperation Council – Achievements, Lessons Learnt and Future Challenges[1]

*By Bjoern Kuehne*

If one compares the situation in 1999, when the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was founded, with the situation in the region today – only eight years later – the difference is striking. Relations between South Eastern European (SEE) countries were still very strained, with limited contacts across borders at any level. Today, contacts on all levels, from the heads of government, through ministries to local municipalities and civil society are a part of the daily routine for many.

The perspective of future European Union (EU) membership for the countries of the region was outlined for the first time in the founding documents of the Stability Pact in 1999. Today Romania and Bulgaria are already EU member states, Croatia is moving ahead swiftly in its negotiations and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has acquired official candidate status, even though a date for starting negotiations has yet to be defined. The other countries either have a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) or are well on track to sign one with the EU in the near future. Only Moldova – a latecomer in the Stability Pact – does not have this perspective of EU membership, but has established contractual relations with the EU as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

The relationship between North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and South Eastern Europe has developed in a similar manner. Most SEE countries are aspiring to membership in the NATO (a goal which Romania and Bulgaria have already reached). Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are hoping for an invitation to join the alliance at the next NATO Summit in Bucharest in spring 2008. Serbia – due to the NATO bombardments in 1999 and the ongoing discussions about the future status of Kosovo which overshadow the relationship – is more reluctant than the other countries of the region but has, together with Bosnia-Herzegovina, received an invitation to join the Partnership for Peace last year.

While the question of the future status of Kosovo is on top of the international agenda, as it already was in 1999, and the constitutional setup of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an issue which

[1] The views presented in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the policy of the Stability Pact.

still needs a lot of attention, both within Bosnia and among international partners, overall the situation in the region has stabilised considerably and the kind of military confrontation which we saw in the 1990s is off the agenda.

***The Conceptual Basis of the Pact and Its Mechanisms***

Clearly, the Stability Pact cannot claim responsibility for all these positive developments, but the Pact did make a significant contribution. The Pact is based on the concept that long-term conflict resolution can only be successful if a comprehensive concept is used as a basis – only if the different aspects of the conflict are addressed can sustainability be ensured. Ensuring democratisation is just as important as laying the foundations for economic and social development and ensuring a secure environment.

The Pact provides a forum for consultations between the countries of the region and those international partners engaged in South Eastern Europe. It also provides a regular forum for contacts among the countries of the region, allowing for interactions at a time when bilateral contacts would still have been politically difficult. These contacts on all levels, from heads of states, to ministers, down to heads of border police or mayors of municipalities on either side of the borders, significantly supported the process of confidence building which is so essential in post-conflict situations.

The Pact also provided a forum for cooperation and coordination on the technical level in areas where there was a clear understanding that regional cooperation was to the advantage of all parties and which were sufficiently removed from the political level to even allow for cooperation between, for instance, Serbian authorities and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo. This kind of regional cooperation – not between diplomats, but between technical experts dealing with the same issue away from the political limelight – is probably one of the key achievements and crucial for confidence building and progress in the different areas. As the EU is essentially one big regional cooperation exercise in multiple technical areas, the Pact therefore also provided a training ground for future EU membership.

The Pact also functioned as an honest broker and match-maker between the international partners. Bringing together institutions like NATO and the World Bank on re-training programmes for decommissioned military personnel in South Eastern Europe – two institutions, which have rarely worked together – was crucial for the social and security environment in the region. Similarly, bringing the European Commission and NATO together in the context of the Ohrid Process on Border Management and Security – at the height of the

debate about a European Defence Identity – was only possible under the neutral umbrella of the Stability Pact. The result was the creation of demilitarised borders in all of South Eastern Europe – something which should not be underestimated in the context of the security situation in the region.

In this context, the question of Kosovo's involvement in the region deserves some attention. Due to the fact that the Stability Pact is not an international organisation, but just a temporary forum with no legal status itself, it was possible to involve Kosovo, represented by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in more or less all the regional processes under the umbrella of the Pact. This happened with the full acceptance of the Serbian government. Based on the agreement that the Pact was not the forum to address the Kosovo status issue, all sides agreed that there was a need to include Kosovo in regional processes to the benefit of all sides. Today, this means that UNMIK is a member of the Energy Treaty on behalf of Kosovo and fully in line with United Nation's Security Council Resolution 1244 and will actually take over the revolving chairmanship of the Treaty for the first six months of 2008. It was one of the first to ratify the new Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) agreement in 2006 and is also a full-fledged partner in many other regional processes. Established cooperation schemes on many technical issues have already created important links between partners in Kosovo and Serbia, which will hopefully continue to function, whatever decision on the future status of Kosovo will be taken.

***Reducing Excessive Expectations***

Since the Kosovo crisis was a key reason behind the launching of the Pact, the regional integration of Kosovo is quite a success. But other aspects have not turned out to be quite as successful. When one looks back at the launch of the Stability Pact in 1999 with President Clinton, Chancellor Schroeder, President Chirac and others descending on Sarajevo, the overblown expectations of what the Pact would bring to the region are quite understandable. The term "quick-start project" – created in this initial phase, to emphasise that the Stability Pact partners wanted to bring an immediate positive impact to the region – is probably one of the biggest public relations mistakes made in the context of the Pact. Everything the people of South Eastern Europe were looking for – economic prosperity, freedom of travel, security – takes time. Using term "quick-start" in the context of large infrastructure projects, which as a rule, have long lead times and many delays, was a particular mistake. For example, one of these quick-start projects, the second Danube bridge between Romania and Bulgaria from Vidin to Calafat has only seen the turning of the first sod a few months ago and actual

construction has still not begun. Contrary to public perception, the Pact was from the very beginning designed as an institution without funds of its own. This was often criticised as its main weakness, but kept the usual turf battles with existing institutions at a minimum and brought out the Pact's main strength, namely to be a neutral forum which brings together the different players to work together for the benefit of the whole region.

In this context, even the task of donor coordination – one of the initial aims of the Pact – was never fully met. Coordination of donors – ensuring funds are made available for priority areas and preventing overlap – are crucial and at the same time very difficult tasks. Donors have their own priorities and will only rarely be willing or even able to change these without lengthy internal procedures. Progress has been made in different issue areas, in specific task forces or initiatives bringing together the countries of the region, donors interested in that particular subject as well as implementing agencies. But on the overall level, the necessary political will was missing. Two big donor conferences in 2000 and 2001 resulted in pledges of more than four billion Euro, but were often rightfully criticised as bringing little additional money. However, assessing the success of the Pact exclusively on the question of how much money the Pact brought to South Eastern Europe – even though the funds that have been made available through the different fora of the Stability Pact are significant – would mean to misunderstand the concept of the Pact. From the start, it had thus to reduce these overblown expectations and the frustrations linked to them. But once the smoke of the initial fireworks disappeared, a more realistic assessment of what the Stability Pact can deliver has taken hold.

***Achievements of the Pact***

The success of the Stability Pact can be judged on two different levels: On the general level, i.e. the establishment of regional cooperation as a normal means of problem solving in SEE, and secondly on the level of specific issue areas.

Today, regional cooperation is an accepted mechanism to address common challenges to the region as a whole. There is a clear understanding in SEE countries that many of those challenges can only be addressed on the regional level. This is certainly just one aspect of the situation in South Eastern Europe, but quite a significant change as compared to the situation in 1999. Moreover, the international partners, the international financial institutions and key donors are increasingly taking a regional approach to South Eastern Europe which is based on the understanding that in a region with many small to medium sized countries a regional approach is more realistic, efficient and effective. This is an important development,

especially when one remembers that these organisations have traditionally been structured to work on a bilateral level.

Important achievements have also been made on the level of specific issues. As regards the return of refugees – obviously one of the key issues in the early phase of the Pact – it was possible to facilitate the return of the large majority of those willing to return to their places of origin. Here, a process was instigated which brought together the three most directly involved countries – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and (former) Serbia-Montenegro – as well as the key international partners UNHCR, OSCE and the European Commission. There are still outstanding issues – and the question of returns to Kosovo will remain for a topic for some time – but the vast majority of those refugees wishing to return have been able to do so.

In the economic field, the history of the CEFTA of 2006, which has entered into force only recently, is a telling story. When the Pact commenced work in this area in 2000 the SEE countries were strongly against concluding a multilateral trade agreement – fears of a recreation of the former Yugoslavia were still very strong and so was the fear of the EU trying to create another permanent waiting room to EU membership. The result was an accord in June 2001 to create a network of bilateral free trade agreements which would establish a virtual free trade area in SEE. A total of 32 trade agreements were subsequently negotiated under the auspices of the Stability Pact Trade Working Group, which was not a minor logistical and managerial achievement and one that also resulted in increased intra-regional trade. The message from foreign investors was clear: create a regional market and you will be a much more attractive destination for foreign investment, which is crucial for the economic development of the whole region. In 2006 agreement was finally reached to transform the existing network of free trade agreements into a multilateral agreement. In a very short time the CEFTA 2006 agreement was negotiated, ratified and finally entered into force. As a consequence, the trade relations in South Eastern Europe were subsequently harmonized.

The Energy Treaty for South Eastern Europe is an interesting example for other reasons. Essentially, the provisions of the treaty imply an extension of the EU's internal energy market to South Eastern Europe and therefore also imply an extension of the EU *acquis* in this particular field – which is in fact a sectoral expansion of the EU before actual accession. Apart from this political significance, the treaty also provides the basis for a cost-effective modernisation of the energy sector in South Eastern Europe. Considering the high costs involved in this field, the willingness to take a regional approach to investment in the energy

sector will result in significant savings for all the countries involved and the best use of limited funds from international partners.

In the security sector, RACVIAC, the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre, is an important example of the role of the Stability Pact in confidence building. Only a few years after the fighting ended, RACVIAC brought together military personnel from SEE countries which had only recently fought each other to address a range of important issues including arms control and confidence building measures. Today, with a much improved security climate, RACVIAC is refocusing its activities to issues of defence conversion and overall politico-military issues.

But much of the successes of the Pact would not have been possible without the clear perspective of European and Euro-Atlantic integration for the countries of South Eastern Europe. This perspective clearly was the key motor for reform and worth much more than millions of Euro.[2] The fact that today, we are in a process of transforming the Stability Pact into a new regional organisation with a firm legal basis and long-term perspective is the best indicator of the positive changes in South Eastern Europe and the success of the Pact.

***Regional Ownership and the Transformation of the Stability Pact***

The three central tasks accorded to the Stability Pact in Cologne and Sarajevo in the summer of 1999 were to help stabilise South Eastern Europe after the conflicts of the 1990s, to support the countries on the path towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration and to facilitate regional cooperation as a means to achieve the previous two aims.

The Pact is in fact a 'victim' of its own success. Today we have a situation in South Eastern Europe in which the rather paternalistic approach of the Pact – whereby cooperation and reforms were largely driven by the international community – is no longer appropriate anymore and where the countries of the region can – and must – take on greater responsibility for their own affairs. This is not to say that the international community should withdraw its support completely, but the continued international support has always been made dependent on stronger regional ownership of these processes.

The process of enhancing regional ownership of the Pact's activities was initiated in May 2005 at the Regional Table in Sofia. A stronger willingness of the countries of South Eastern

[2] See the contribution of Dusan Reljic in this volume.

Europe, combined with a gentle nudge from the key international donors, has paved the way for the transfer of tasks from the Stability Pact to the newly created Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) in February 2008. The new institution will have a Secretariat in Sarajevo and a small Liaison Office in Brussels to facilitate cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. It will be led by a secretary-general from South Eastern Europe, the current state secretary in the Croatian foreign ministry Hido Biscevic. One third of the running costs of the new institution will be covered by the South Eastern European countries themselves, a fact which underlines their commitment to the process.

The tasks of the RCC will be very similar to those of the Stability Pact: to facilitate regional cooperation as a means of managing the challenges to South Eastern Europe as well as supporting the European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region. The main difference is that the RCC will be led politically by the countries of the region, that the Secretariat will be largely staffed by personnel from the region and that the process will, at least partially, be financed by the SEE governments. It is important to note that this agenda is not imposed from the outside, but driven from within. The international community is taking on a more supportive role while leaving the driver's seat to the region itself. The RCC will continue to be a format where the South Eastern European countries come together with the key supporters of the international community. Apart from the SEE countries and UNMIK/Kosovo the EU troika, represented by the EU presidency, the European Commission and the Council Secretariat, and those international partners actively and substantially engaged in regional cooperation in SEE will be full-fledged members of the RCC.

The change of the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) in recent years is an important indication of the growing willingness of the SEE countries to take care of their own affairs. One of the few initiatives coming out of the region itself, it has developed from a regular platform for high-level political declarations to a forum with significant political commitment from the participating countries. It is envisaged that the SEECP will provide the political umbrella for the RCC which in turn can provide operational capacities – through its Secretariat and the different task forces and initiatives inherited from the Pact – as well as an institutional link to the donor community.

How the RCC will develop in the long run is of course still in the stars. It will need to prove that it can deliver results for both the SEE countries and for the donor community. But the basis is laid and there are a number of well-established examples which may indicate where

the RCC is heading. The Baltic Sea Council or the Nordic Council are successful examples of cooperation processes bringing together EU member states and neighbouring countries which have common issues to address. Having a regional forum such as the RCC can be useful even when one day most or even all of its members are part of the European Union.

## A Long Way towards EU Accession? - Membership Perspectives and the Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkan Countries

*By Dušan Reljić*

The good news went almost unnoticed: In mid-September 2007 a senior French official indicated that Paris might amend a clause in the French constitution which ties accessions of new member states to the European Union (EU) to a referendum. Back in 2005, this so-called "Turkish clause" had been introduced into the constitution as Article 88-7 under the former President Jacques Chirac. With this rule, Chirac targeted Turkey in a bid to influence the popular sentiment in France and to achieve a positive outcome of the forthcoming referendum on the EU constitutional treaty. *Les citoyens* turned the constitution down, but the "Turkish clause" remained in place and thus effectively barred the Western Balkan countries from entering the EU (Croatia was exempted as the membership negotiations with that country were already underway). Under the present circumstances, and even if the European Commission would recommend the entry of a Western Balkan country into the EU, it is not likely that the many million French voters would be called to the ballots only to decide, for instance, if they approve of Macedonia's membership in the Union. Unless the "Turkish clause" is removed, it will continue to corrupt the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) which the EU has set up for Western Balkan countries in 1999 as the door opener for eventual accession. In effect, the EU's enlargement into the Western Balkans is not a realistic perspective as long as this French constitutional clause remains in place.

Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn and the other EU mandarins in Brussels have repeatedly emphasised that enlargement is the essence of the EU's "soft power" to extend peace, democracy and prosperity to the whole of Europe. Rehn also warned the EU governments "not to wobble" on this issue. In the words of Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, the EU cannot pretend that there is "somehow a piece of non-Europe in the middle of Europe". Undoubtedly, if the Western Balkan states should remain outside of the EU in the long term, a different political dynamism would develop in this region. This in turn would most likely generate outcomes which might be harmful to the EU's central goal of ensuring stability on the continent. One disturbing but realistic vision is a protracted conflict in the region between the Albanian populated entities and the Serb areas with Washington and Moscow supporting Tirana/Pristina and Belgrade/Banja Luka respectively.

However, because of the so-called "enlargement fatigue" (which found its hypertrophied expression in the French "Turkish clause"), there is, mildly speaking, hesitation on behalf of the EU on how to proceed further with the enlargement process. As a result, many people in the Western Balkans do not recognise the EU accession any longer as a convincing political perspective. For them EU membership has turned into a moving target that is constantly escaping further and further. Thus, the transformative power of the EU in the Western Balkans is diminishing and the EU itself risks the danger of sinking into irrelevance in its self-proclaimed role as the principal transformative power in the region. At the same time, the multitude of hot-spots in the region of former Yugoslavia is not becoming smaller. To the contrary, the autumn of 2007 has started with newly inflamed political confrontations in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Macedonia - in the latter case even with sporadic violent incidents. The ongoing escalation shows that peace in this part of Europe is neither irrevocable nor self-sustaining.

Until now, the political class in all the countries of the Western Balkans is still overwhelmingly supporting membership in the EU as the best way to stabilize the region in the long term. Therefore there is widespread hope that the biggest palpable hindrance to EU accession – the "Turkish clause" – will be soon removed. Apparently, the new idea in Paris now is not to cancel the referendum altogether, but to allow the head of state to decide whether to call a popular vote or having a parliamentary ratification only. In this way, the incumbent French President Nicolas Sarkozy could retain his opposition to Turkey's EU bid, but at the same time open the passage for some or all of the West Balkan countries once this becomes imminent. A softening of the French position towards further EU enlargement in Southeast Europe just before Paris takes over the EU presidency in the second half of 2008 would come across as a kind gesture to the increasingly troubled region. More to the point, it would not cost much, neither politically nor financially, as the EU accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania appears to be a matter of the distant future – perhaps as far way as 2020, according to some voices in France. Or already in 2012, as Serbia's vice-premier Božidar Đelić, in charge of EU affairs, has ventured. In reality, any guess is as good as the other: no one can predict how fast the EU will itself adapt politically to the challenges of further enlargement and how successful, in the eyes of the EC, the candidate countries will be in their quest to fulfil the membership criteria. Ambiguity is the most prominent characteristic of the present stage of the EU's enlargement policy.

***The Strategy and its Price***

The new troubles in the region will eventually force the EU leaders to focus again on its relationship with the Western Balkans, much in the same manner as in 2003 when Serbia's Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić was assassinated. The EU reacted to this political homicide, which obviously aimed to destabilise Serbia and thus also the region, by strongly reaffirming the membership perspective for the Western Balkan countries at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003. However, the political impetus from Thessaloniki did not last long very long as the bizarre chapter over the French "Turkish clause" proved. Admittedly, the offer to the Western Balkan countries is still on the table that they would be welcome to join the EU once they meet the conditions. All the same, the amount of EU money dedicated to the region is stagnating. More than any political declaration, the EU's fiscal decisions provide evidence that the support for the transformation of the traumatised Western Balkan societies is also stagnating.

One has to remember that already at the Feira European Council in June 2000, the countries of the Western Balkans were designated as "potential members". This was the EU's scheme to foster stability in the region of former Yugoslavia after protracted wars which endangered the EU's security as well. Until now, the one and only guiding model for the political futures of these countries has been the membership perspective in the EU. For these countries, it was this possibility of one day joining the EU which had proven to be the most important stimulus for domestic political reforms and has achieved far-reaching transformative effects. It was "in the name of Europe" that the governments everywhere in the region were able to justify their political steps and reforms, for instance when dealing with war crimes suspects or re-establishing relations with their former battlefield foes. And vice versa: since the Western Balkan countries figured as potential membership candidates, the EU pushed outward into this region many projects to combat threats to its internal security, such as transnational crime, illegal migration and political instability at its borders.

The EU's strategy towards the Western Balkans thus rests on the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Its principal aim is to assist the six countries in their attempts to overcome the effects of the wars in the 1990s, ameliorate the rampant social hardships, improve public administration and achieve democratic stability. Every autumn, the European Commission publishes Progress Reports on each country. They assess the ability of the candidate countries to transpose and implement EU legislation and the progress in adopting EU standards and in fulfilling other specific conditions, such as regional cooperation as well

as cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Once the European Commission considers that a country has progressed enough, it is invited to conclude a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). After it is signed, it commits both sides to a contractual relationship which might lead to accession negotiations and, finally, to EU membership. The SAA process is based on the assumption that the lengthy accession procedure will promote conflict resolution, economic growth and state-building in the region. In fact, it thus rests on the premise that the Western Balkans should become like the rest of Europe. In turn, advancement in the Western Balkans should contribute to the security of the EU and pave the way towards the goal of having a single European space of peace and prosperity.

Since January 2007 the EU has concentrated all of its aid programs for the Western Balkans and Turkey in the new Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). This instrument consists of five components: transition assistance and institution building; cross-border cooperation; regional development; human resources development; and rural development. The last three are only open to candidate countries as they shall prepare for the management of the EU's Structural and Cohesion Fund as well as rural developments after accession. The assistance to potential candidate countries focuses on institution building with the purpose to strengthen compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria for accession. IPA's budget for the years 2007 to 2013 amounts to 11.5 billion Euro, significantly less than the 14 billion initially proposed by the Commission. In effect, during this period the West Balkan countries will receive a fraction of the aid per capita which the EU has put at the disposal of Central European states as well as to the then accession candidates Romania and Bulgaria. While officials in Brussels concede that the diminished allocation of aid assistance to the Western Balkans reflect the "enlargement fatigue" in the EU, they also insist that these countries will not receive less aid until 2013 than they already have in the most recent years. Nevertheless, the stagnation in the development aid mostly affects the less developed parts of the Western Balkans, which also have to cope with the most difficult political, economic, security and social problems, namely Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

***The State of Affairs***

The European Commission started accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia in October 2005. At the beginning, the talks with Croatia progressed swiftly. Recently, however, there have been signals that the Commission wants more time to observe how stable and deep-rooted Croatia's democratic consolidation really is. Judicial reforms, the treatment of ethnic

minorities, bringing war criminals to justice, the fight against corruption and the economic reforms still seem to be lagging behind. Even so, it could happen that the negotiations with Zagreb arrive at a positive conclusion while at this moment the EU is politically not ready for further enlargement, because there is no consensus among the 27 member states about the issue. This would surely send a clear signal to the other candidate countries and potential candidates that the EU is not standing to its promises and that, possibly, all the transformative efforts and corresponding political costs for them could be in vain. The case of Macedonia has already indicated that the EU's political considerations – which have little to do with the actual achievements of particular countries within the SAP – have a strong influence on the EU's decisions.

Although the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was granted the status of a candidate country in December 2005, the accession negotiations have not yet begun. The EU was relatively fast to grant Skopje such a privileged status as this was part of the prolonged Western effort to stabilise this fragile state.[3] The most southern of the former Yugoslav republics was almost torn apart in 2001 by an emerging civil war between its majority Macedonian and minority Albanian population. Fortunately, a full-scale civil war was avoided through a Western diplomatic intervention. The lagging pace of the inner socio-economic consolidation and the difficult perspectives for a functioning political coexistence of the two dominant ethnic communities in Macedonia still give reason for concern. Moreover, the political problems in Kosovo also affect Macedonia. This explains to a certain extent Brussels' hesitation to speed up the negotiations with Skopje. Yet, the critical reason is that further enlargement is simply not among the priorities of the EU even if the issue of a constitutional treaty appears resolved after the Lisbon summit. At this meeting in October 2007, EU leaders endorsed a new reform treaty to replace the controversial EU Constitutional Treaty. After 2014 some important reforms will take place such as reducing the size of the European Commission and a phased redistribution of voting weights between the member states in the Council. In terms of the necessary adaptation of the EU's institutions, these reforms will make future enlargement technically feasible. What remains unclear is whether the EU member states will in fact have the political will to fulfil their promises.

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia, including Kosovo as a United Nations protactorate under Security Council Resolution 1244, are potential candidate countries for EU membership. In spite of evident flaws in the functioning of the democratic

[3] See the contribution of Veton Latifi in this volume.

structures and of the market economy in these three countries, they have political, business and cultural elites who have placed EU accession on top of their agendas. Also, support for entering the EU on behalf of the populations is still strong, although opinion polls indicate little knowledge of the facts concerning the implications of joining the EU internal market and accepting supranational political and legal obligations. Depending on their further inner political consolidation these four countries will presumably move more and more apart from each other on their way to the status of a candidate country. This disaggregation will have adverse implications for regional cooperation: Already now, the preparations of some new or perspective EU member countries for the participation in the Schengen Agreement shattered the several decades long tradition of visa-free travel between Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and the Western Balkan countries. In return, the population of those countries (especially the younger generation), which is excluded from regional and European free travel, finds it increasingly difficult to sympathise with their privileged neighbouring countries and, indeed, to identify with European values altogether.

Albania signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU on June 12, 2006, Montenegro on October 15, 2007 and Serbia will probably do so by mid-2008. While the lingering political crises in Albania, caused by ongoing conflicts within the country's leadership, has little effects on its neighbours, the regional stability depends much on the cumulative political risks in Serbia and its Kosovo province, in Macedonia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The case of Serbia offers a confusing situation which is due to the contradicting political assumptions on the side of some EU member states. Some members (notably Austria, Slovenia and Italy) advocate Belgrade's speedy advancement to the candidate status, because they believe that this would induce Serbia to show "flexibility" over the Kosovo issue (that is to allow the secession of its province). Others (such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) seem to prefer a stronger conditionality in the EU's relationship with Serbia (mostly concerning Belgrade's lacklustre cooperation with the Hague Tribunal). At the same time, some conservative political voices in Serbia have started arguing against Belgrade's eventual EU membership if Brussels and/or the more influential EU member states recognise a unilateral independence proclamation by the Albanian-dominated government in Kosovo. Correspondingly, they demand Serbia's geopolitical realignment in the form of a new strategic partnership with Russia which they consider to be the only ally in the fight to "defend Kosovo". If the EU would "lose Serbia", it would, of course, in the first place shrink

Serbia's own development potential. It would also deal a blow to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy as such a scenario would demonstrate that the EU's "soft power" cannot meet the challenges of realpolitik which the United States and Russia openly pursued during the Kosovo conflict by projecting their power directly into this part of Europe through their respective support of one of the conflicting sides.

The outlook for Bosnia is also ambiguous as this country still continues to suffer from the its internal war between 1992 and 1995. Persistent ethnic divisions have prevented constitutional reforms and other measures that would foster long-term stabilisation. The need for political guidance and external security provision (now almost fully in the EU's hands) in Bosnia will not diminish for a long time to come. Bosnia's stability has been recently jeopardized not only by the heated discussions between the leaders of its Muslim and Serbian communities, but also by the spill-over effects of the Kosovo crises. The opponents of a unitary Bosnian state point to the Western support for Albanian secession in the Serbian province and then ask why self-determination is denied to them. The answer to this question becomes more and more difficult because one of the strongest factors which support Bosnia's cohesion – the perspective of EU membership for the country – seems to be petering out. At the same time, the main reason for the vanishing of the EU perspective is the political fragility of this state, due to the unresolved ethno-political disputes. In this way a downward spiral is created as an unexpected outcome of the present conditionality mechanism between the potential candidate countries and the EU.

Kosovo is the bleakest spot in the region as all international diplomatic manoeuvres to find a solution for the conflict between the Serb and Albanian nationalisms over Kosovo's final legal and political status appear futile. Brussels has incessantly been repeating the assurance that "Kosovo has an EU future", nonetheless what kind of contractual relation might emerge will depend on the political *denouement*. In spite of all contingencies, the EU in 2006 has obliged itself to replace the faltering UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The switch over could take place in the spring of 2008. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Mission in Kosovo will be the largest and most expansive peace operation of this kind which the EU has undertaken to date. It will include about 1800 international policemen, judges, prosecutors and custom officials. At the same time, the EU office in Pristina is planned to grow and include around 80 staff members. Moreover, the EU Special Representative in Kosovo (EUSR) would also act as the International Civilian Representative in charge of the International Civilian Office, a similarly omnipotent institution as UNMIK currently is. Just

like the latter, the new office will have the power to replace democratically elected representatives if their political actions are deemed disruptive for the peace process. Here another paradox emerges in the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans: although Kosovo is the region which least satisfies the compatibility criteria, the EU is poised to act as a neo-colonial power, to rule over this territory and thus to be more involved (and to a higher price) than anywhere else in the region. As the distinguished Bulgarian historian Ivan Krastev noted already several years ago, the only alternative to imperial Europe is enlarged Europe.

Brussels will have to remain attentive to its role as the main stability provider for the Western Balkans unless it wants to put its Common Foreign and Security Policy at risk. The European Commission must increase its financial commitments to the region and strengthen the accession-oriented programs of IPA. But above all, it would serve the interests of both the EU and the Western Balkans best if an unequivocal road-map would be adopted by the EU and the involved states setting a definite time table for the accession of the region's countries to the EU. As the former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato and the German President Richard von Weizsaecker have proposed already two years ago in their seminal report on the future of the Balkans, Western Balkan countries should join the EU by 2014. In that same year Europe will also remember the centennial anniversary of the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo which sparked the First World War in 1914 and led to the ensuing catastrophes of the last century in Europe. Now, after the Lisbon summit determined 2014 to be the launching year of reforms in the EU, it would also be an excellent year to celebrate the completion of Europe – also in Sarajevo.

## Prospects for the Europeanisation of State-Building Efforts in Kosovo and Bosnia

*By Vedran Dzihic*

Almost twelve years after the war ended in Bosnia and more than eight years after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Kosovo, the Western Balkans is a region still confronted with a number of deeply rooted problems. With the exception of Croatia, the region's profile is still bleak – a mixture of weak states and international protectorates with low economic growth, high unemployment rates, continuing dominance of ethno-nationalistic policies and rhetoric, and a public which is still pessimistic towards its own elites and future. If one focuses on Bosnia and Kosovo, the difficulties in the transition towards democracy and sustainable economic development can be explained by a specific form of transition which substantially differs from Croatia, Macedonia and also Serbia. Bosnia and Kosovo face a "triple transition" (from war to peace, from humanitarian aid to sustainable development and from a socialist political systems and centrally planned economies to democracy, civil society and a free-market economy), which makes it extraordinarily difficult for both international and local actors to efficiently address the multiplicity of interrelated and complex challenges. This – together with a number of shortcomings in the strategy of international stakeholders – helps to explain why Bosnia and Kosovo are falling behind in the region by almost every political, socio-economical, and democratic indicator for the transition process. Despite enormous sums of money donated and efforts undertaken by the international community (and in particular by the EU) a clear vision and perspective for the future of Bosnia and Kosovo is still missing.

After some rather general considerations about the role and impact of the European Union (EU) on the developments in Bosnia and Kosovo and about the concept of "Europeanisation" and its shortcomings I will briefly sketch the recent situation in the region by focussing on pressing issues in the year 2007 and conclude with some thoughts about the European future of the Western Balkans in general and Bosnia and Kosovo in particular. Before I address the EU's role in the Western Balkans, some crucial terms have to be defined. By using the term "democratisation" I refer to the process of transition from the former socialist regime towards liberal and market-oriented democracy of the Western type. The fact that the Western Balkans has experienced parallel transformations in politics, the economy, state institutions, and social affairs is a peculiarity which makes the democratisation in this specific region rather difficult. Besides this "dilemma of simultaneities" the process of building a stable national framework ("state-building") can be seen as another essential aspect of the Western Balkans' development in

the last 15 years. Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1996 and Kosovo since 1999 are the most prominent examples of "state-building" under strong external influence. Starting with the year 2000, external "democratisation" (which includes state-building as a process of developing stable statehood as a precondition for stability of the region) takes increasingly place in the form of "Europeanisation" in the region. This can be understood as a process of incorporating European ideas, values, norms, rules, and procedures in the domestic political framework of the Western Balkan countries.

***The EU in the Western Balkans: From the Yugoslav Crisis to a Comprehensive Policy Approach***

In the 1980s Yugoslavia was the only country of South Eastern Europe knocking at the door of the European Community by concluding an agreement with the Community on special relations which also included the prospects for membership. The crisis of the 1990s turned out to become a deep disillusion for the EU which failed to act in the face of this crisis and thus destroyed the widespread hope that "the hour of Europe" had finally arrived. Instead, the United States took over the leadership in the region and engaged actively in ending the conflicts by using its dominant military power. But ending the war proved to be much easier than shaping the freedom and building viable states in the Western Balkans. It was only after the conclusion of the Kosovo war that the EU started to actively engage in state-building efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo and to launch the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in 2000 as a new and comprehensive policy approach for the whole region. This process was designed to lead the countries of the Western Balkans towards the final goal of integration into the EU by combining the instruments of stabilisation and integration. The membership perspective, which was strongly reiterated at the EU-Balkans Thessaloniki summit in June 2003, became one of the strongest instrument to initiate and foster necessary reforms within the countries. Last but not least the EU's commitment to extend its frontiers and thus to "promote" democracy throughout the Western Balkans has to be understood as a great socio-political initiative aiming at the all-encompassing reorganisation of the societies in the region. Kosovo and Bosnia in their present shape are still far away from a new and modern form of statehood and thus from the ultimate goal of full EU-integration. In the last two years, endless status talks and the emergence of a new form of nationalism as well as a de facto reform-stop in Bosnia made Kosovo and Bosnia lose tempo and fall behind the other countries of the region. Due to these developments, the destabilisation potential for the whole region is growing.

The crucial question for the EU's enlargement and democratisation strategy towards the Western Balkans is what makes the region's Europeanisation different from that of other countries in transition, particularly from that of Eastern Europe. Let us try to identify some specific aspects of the Western Balkans' Europeanisation, briefly analyse some of the shortcomings of the EU's efforts by taking into account its past role in Bosnia and in Kosovo and propose some possible new ways of thinking about Europeanisation and about the potential for improvement of the EU's performance in the region.

***The EU's Policy towards Bosnia and Kosovo Revisited – Some General Problems and Considerations***

The process of belated nation-state-building has had the most profound effect on the transformation processes in the Western Balkans in the last 15 years and thus on the ability of the EU to influence this process. Following this presumption, it can be argued that the main dilemmas of the Western Balkans and of the EU stem from the unfinished nation-state-building processes and still dominant ethno-nationalistic patterns of thought, action, and practices.

Bosnia and Herzegovina in the last two years is the best possible example to demonstrate the overwhelming influence of ethno-nationalistic patterns of thought in the process of state-building and Europeanisation. Bosnia has reached a crossroad as it has just entered the "pre-European" phase, but just at this important point it is once again falling back into a crisis marked by deep apathy, mutual accusations among the political elites und the widespread use of ethno-nationalist arguments to realise narrow political and economic interests. Bosnia's crucial problems are related to "ethnic collectivism" which more then twelve years after Dayton can still be identified as an intrinsic part of Bosnia's present. In this case democracy tends to become much more part of the problem than part of the solution. This is primarily the case because democracy as it was conceptualised in Dayton and applied in the subsequent years addresses and empowers the rights, interests, and aims of the dominant ethnic group and makes it much more difficult for the ethnic and other minorities to realise its rights. As long as Dayton - which for sure was a good compromise to stop the war, but a rotten compromise when it comes to building a functioning state – continues to be the reference point for democratisation of the country by prioritizing the rights of dominant ethnic groups, rather than of the individual citizens, it will be impossible to move beyond the present situation and thus to move towards EU integration.

The widespread belief in "automatic" democratisation through regularly held elections and the formal-institutionalist bias applied to Bosnia and Kosovo have their roots in the experience of Western democratic countries. In order to strengthen the democracy and Europeanisation appeal in Bosnia there is an obvious need for a stronger shift of focus towards the people and their everyday problems that arise in the course of democratisation/Europeanisation. In order for democracy to become "the only show in town" it is inevitable that the principles of democracy find their way directly into the people's attitude towards their governments, and that they are carried by pro-democracy actions and deeds of elites and ordinary citizens alike. Therefore, attitudes towards democracy and democratic practices in the Western Balkans should be much more carefully examined by the EU and its stakeholders. Rather than promoting and implementing a formal-technocratic form of democracy, a broader definition of democracy should be privileged. Democracy should thus be seen as a specifically modern form of cultural and political practice in the spirit of European Enlightenment and as a forum of social knowledge which is centred around the freedoms and rights of the individual, the trade-off of interests by codetermination and participation of all citizens in political processes in the broadest sense, and as a system of "checks and balances".

As regards the praxis of "Europeanisation" in the context of nation-building processes in the Western Balkans, the above described bias towards formal institutionalism creates enormous problems. It is especially problematic in the Western Balkans' context because it confirms Western hegemony and fortifies power positions of the national elites. This hegemonic dimension and its discursive mechanism are described in the literature as "Balkanism" (Todorova). Europe thereby constructs the Balkans as immanent „other", the „less developed pre-modern entity" which is used to reassert her own „progressiveness", "modernity" and "superior democratic statehood". Thereby, one is immunized against the specific regional reality and misses the opportunity to question one's own normative ideas and concepts. This means that „Europe" has become an essential political concept in the Western Balkans in the last 15 years. Within the Western Balkan countries Europe is still used as a kind of a space for a variety of glorifying, idealizing, and sentimental projections. As a direct consequence, people probably expect too much from the EU-integration and the international community in general,[4] which leads to a deep gap between the excessive expectations on the one side and things the EU can realistically offer on the other. Europe is seen as the guarantor for a better future which should bring democracy and prosperity to the country and modernise the societies. At the same time, Europe is used as a „political weapon" in the hands of elites.

[4] See also the contribution of Bjoern Kuehne in this volume.

These elites try to realise their own political and economic interests by using „Europe“.[5] This is made possible by the very diffuse und unclear perceptions of Europe within the broader public. Politicizing and mythologizing „Europe“ by the political elites, as could be witnessed in the run-up to the Bosnian elections in the autumn of 2006, is seriously slowing down the speed of the Europeanisation processes in Bosnia and Kosovo. That means that more realism and intensified efforts by the EU are needed and that the local authorities have to better inform people on the real consequences of the EU integration process in order to overcome the expectation gap.

A further peculiarity of the region is the sudden clash of different concepts of “Europe” and “democracy” in the dialogues between internal and external elites on the one hand and between elites and the population on the other. Demands and guidelines of external actors collide with interests and expectations of internal actors which have with different concepts and understandings of the same terms. A current example for the collision of internal interests and external demands offers the present debate about police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A further critical point for a successful democratisation and Europeanisation of Bosnia and Kosovo is the regional dimension of the Western Balkans which is much more important than in any other previous enlargement process of the EU. The countries of the region, formerly a part of the common Yugoslav state, are inextricably bound up with each other by historical, cultural, political, social and economical ties. Thus regional cooperation, already formally defined as an explicit condition for moving towards EU integration – and in contrast to the predominantly bilateral approach espoused by the European Commission – should easily become an essential tool for stabilising a region in a longer term. As the difficult and dangerous bargaining about Kosovo demonstrates, each and every approach that does not pay attention to the wider region is doomed to fail. So what needs to be done? The EU must more forcefully promote the issue of the regional cooperation as one of the cornerstones of its strategy for the Western Balkans. For example, the Stability Pact as one of the EU’s basic instruments for strengthening regional cooperation raised expectations which could not be met and thus resulted in disappointments in the region. Regional cooperation must not be a second or third-rank policy goal of the EU - it should rather be promoted as a cornerstone of the EU’s Western Balkan policy. Therefore the previous regional approach needs careful recalibration. Thinking in a visionary way, the EU and the countries of the region should start working on new forms of a wider regional cooperation, including, for example, countries like

[5] See also the similar argumentation of Veton Latifi on Macedonia in this volume.

Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Greece, Turkey and Italy in a supranational, yet flexible, network. Such a regional network will be able to formulate and lobby for common needs and interests in Brussels in a much more efficient and innovative way. At the same time, each state must demonstrate a true commitment to improve good neighbourly relations and increase political, economic and cultural cooperation with its neighbours in order to progress towards the EU. In turn, the EU would grant the Western Balkan countries access to the full package of pre-accession assistance and thus the same kind of support as the East-European countries were given in the nineties. Providing pre-accession assistance will strengthen the EU's position in the Western Balkans and create better opportunities to push for effective reforms. Pre-accession assistance should be accomplished by concrete and practical measures like the establishment of visa-programs for young people.

***Kosovo on the EU's Mind***

The unresolved issue of Kosovo's legal status has returned into the list of international headlines. Shortly before the EU troika – consisting of Wolfgang Ischinger as EU representative, US diplomat Frank Wisner and Russia's Alexander Botsan-Kharcehnko – will present their negotiation results to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon on December 10, the tensions and speculations are rising. Considering the strictly opposite positions between Kosovo and Serbia concerning the final status of the former Yugoslav province, a unilateral declaration of independence is becoming a more and more realistic option. This scenario, which is openly backed by the US administration and strictly opposed by Putin's Russia, entails the potential to seriously damaging the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and to split the EU (which is at the same time pressing ahead with a massive civilian mission in Kosovo). Germany and France have already indicated that they would support a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo's parliament, but some other EU members like Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus or Rumania are concerned that such a step could send the wrong signal to minorities and separatist forces at home.

Given this threat to European unity and the fact that it will be charged with the implementation of any future agreement for Kosovo, the EU should use the time until the December 10 deadline to try its best to reach an internal consensus on the issue. Irrespective of the status negotiations' outcome it will be vital for the stability of Kosovo to deploy the new International Civilian Presence (ICP) and Rule of Law mission as soon as possible. Considering the current absence of any diplomatic breakthrough, the dead end of the alternative "independence versus autonomy" (in different possible forms ranging from Hong

Kong-model to other confederation models) could be avoided by a far-reaching and unique concept by the EU for the time after the status decision. Making Kosovo a unique case within the whole enlargement strategy would first of all require a rather ambitious and far-reaching "EU post-status-package". This tailor-made package for Kosovo would have to include technical mechanisms and financial resources with which Kosovo could be integrated into the SAP as quickly as possible and receive the opportunity in a regional context to participate as a full EU partner in the pre-accession-funds. This package must furthermore entail new and innovative ways to reorganize the Kosovo's weak economy and address the issues of poverty and unemployment offensively. In this context, measures of debt relief and a facilitated membership in the World Bank, IMF, and some other relevant UN entities would be essential. The package would also include effective measures for strengthening the rule of law and helping Kosovo's institutions to improve the level of transparency at the local and central levels as a basis to attract investments. A visa regime that separates the people of Kosovo and Bosnia from neighbouring states which are already EU members (such as Bulgaria and Rumania) or on their way to accession (like Croatia) must be replaced by a new and smart visa policy. This policy would combine specific relaxations for young people and members of the business community as a first step and include further relaxations once the countries have met specific conditions. Such a policy could also help mobilize popular support for the EU and for the necessary reforms on the way towards EU membership.

Despite shortcomings and exaggerated expectations, the EU is still viewed as a source of hope for a better future of Kosovo. At the same time, Europe is also increasingly used as a projection area and as a political weapon. From the Kosovo Albanian side, for example, European governmental norms are seen as a proof for the necessity of Kosovo's independence and against an internal partition of Kosovo itself. This only enhances the need to bridge the gap between the European orientations of the Kosovar population on the one hand and the lack of knowledge about the EU and the path towards the EU on the other through an offensive communication policy. In this way, the EU could not only shed its image in Kosovo as a technocratic, bureaucratic apparatus, but also generate sufficient political support for the EU integration process among Kosovo's population. The same is obviously also true for Bosnia.

***EU and the Western Balkans on a Search for a New Style and Substance***

In sum, the present situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo poses a threat to the EU's unity and its capacities in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy. At the same time, the current situation could pressure the EU to finally find a way on how to deal with instability in the Western Balkans. Looking back at the past years of crisis, wars, and troublesome state- and nation-building efforts in the Western Balkans, it is high time for the European Union to move beyond the classical and "top-down" state-building. Searching for improvements of EU policy towards the Western Balkans, it should be taken into account that foreign and predominantly top-down oriented models are only of limited use to improve the situation in the region. There is a need for creative solutions which would raise the readiness of local political stakeholders to cooperate with each other and which would be designed to move beyond "state-building" as a top-down and western-dominated strategy. Instead a successful strategy would rest on "member state-building" (as was proposed by the International Commission on the Balkans) which would enhance the notion of "ownership" in Bosnia and Kosovo. This strategy would aim at the establishment of states which sooner or later would be full members of the larger European Union with all the rights and duties.

"Member state-building" could thus become a new approach which is characterized by a new style and a new substance of Europeanisation. This approach should include a courageous and convincing vision and strategy for democratisation in the region, including the better and more rational use of the stick-and-carrot principle as well as enhanced IPA-funds. It would also emphasize the conditionality and ownership principles and enable the involved actors to overcome their donor-dependency. Finally – as already mentioned above – the natural need for regional cooperation must strongly come to the fore of the EU conditionality policy. Only strong regional ties, based on mutual political and economical cooperation and understanding, would push the Western Balkans forward and make the region's development self-supporting.

In the end, and no matter how consistent the EU approach and the strategy may be, the reform process will ultimately fail if the countries of the Western Balkans and their elected representatives continue to ignore the need for a substantial change from ethno-nationalist and particularistic thinking and acting towards a people-oriented and civic understanding of state and politics.

## Preventive Engagement of the International Community: The Model Case of Macedonia?

*By Veton Latifi*

### *Macedonia and the Challenge of Multi-Ethnic State-Building*

In principle, Macedonia has all the necessary ingredients to become a positive model of multi-ethnic state-building: demographic diversity, social and economic balance, a new constitution which reflects the country's multi-cultural composition and the significant support of the international community to implement the process. Strongly supported and even pressured by the international community, the ethnic Macedonian and Albanian communities signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in August 2001. The OFA ended a months-long armed conflict in the country and prevented it from escalating into full-scale civil war. The agreement stipulates that Macedonia shall be a multi-cultural state, where no ethnic group dominates the other, and that a specific approach to nation- and statehood shall prevail. The OFA foresees the improvement of human rights, more effective political organisations and activities, functioning state institutions and a decentralisation of power.

In practice, Macedonia has so far not been able to perform this model role. The principal reason for this is the ongoing dependence of progress in multi-ethnic state-building on external pressure and resources, not least from the European Union (EU), because the domestic political class in Macedonia has resisted full implementation of the OFA and other international reform agendas. Specifically, the successive Macedonian governments have attempted to slow down the reforms which are related to the implementation of OFA.

Ethnic politics is still one of the main principles of the Macedonian political system and politics. There are cross-ethnic political partnerships among the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian political parties, but they are often fragile and mostly depend on concrete political benefits. Participation in the coalition governments is perceived as being externally imposed and the partners do not yet perceive a strategic self-interest in multi-ethnic state-building itself. Like many other central, eastern and southern European countries, Macedonia is also undergoing a profound "social transformation" – a transition and transformation of all levels of society. This transition does not occur randomly, but in a systematic and continuous ways, especially in regard to deep-rooted transformation of the state institutions (which is another factor causing delays in the process of the multi-ethnic state-building).

One of the main theoretical, political, practical and historical challenges in multi-ethnic countries with complicated identity relationships is the achievement of internal cohesion. Obviously, this is also the case for Macedonia. During the communist regime this kind of cohesion was imposed, for example, through ideological repression. With the emergence of political and cultural pluralism, the issue of voluntary cohesion was again raised. With the collapse of the socialistic system in Yugoslavia new states and multi-ethnic societies like Macedonia became ethnocentric by imposing their national codes as a starting point for internal cohesion. This practice provoked a continuing resistance from the Albanian community.

***Preventive Engagement of the International Community***

When the political tensions between Macedonians and Albanians threatened to overstep the threshold of manifest violence, the international community reacted quite differently as compared to earlier Balkan crises. This was obviously due to the lessons learnt in Bosnia and Kosovo. This time, the international engagement was distinct in at least three different ways: 1) it was a timely reaction which was truly preventive and which was at the same time connected to a long-term approach, 2) it rested primarily on political means, with the military component serving the preventive engagement and 3) it reflected a common transatlantic approach. The cessation of hostilities and the start of the implementation process of the OFA would not have been possible without the mediation of the international community, which was eventually accompanied and followed by a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) arms-collecting military mission.

The international community was involved in Macedonia from the very beginning of the peace-building process. It is quite important to note that the conflict was successfully de-escalated early on and that this was achieved within the framework of the existing constitutional order.[6] Therefore, the conflict in Macedonia never reached the level of violence seen in the previous fighting in Bosnia, Kosovo and Croatia.[7] Accordingly, intense international pressure was deployed to prevent the conflict from escalating and to minimise the use of violence.

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6 Democracy, Security and Economic Development in SEE (2002). CKID and KAS. Skopje, p. 88.

7 Official data from the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Ministry of Defense of Macedonia indicates that by the end of July 2001, a total of 38 members of the security forces (the army and police) had been killed and 220 wounded. The level of casualties among Albanian guerrilla fighters killed was not made public as a final figure, but according to the IWPR book "Ohrid and Beyond" (eds. Skopje. 2003, p. 35) that refer to the representatives of Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) party established after NLA disbanded, 74 guerrillas were killed and no more than 35 Albanian civilians perished. About 15 civilians were physically attacked and tortured and around 20 kidnapped. The fate of at least 12 kidnap victims is still unknown.

The early preventive engagement in 2001 was then linked to an approach of the EU and the international community which aimed at the OFA's implementation as well as at a long-term accession perspective of Macedonia to the EU. The international community thus continued to improve its conflict prevention mechanisms in Macedonia not only immediately after the halt of the armed conflict, but also in the following months and years. There is no doubt that these long-term instruments and mechanisms served the integration of countries from eastern and central Europe very well.[8] Nevertheless, they need to be continuously reviewed in the case of Macedonia, as the country's needs and circumstances could call for new solutions.

In comparison to Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community pursued its conflict-preventing engagement in Macedonia with more specific instruments, e.g. intense international pressure, application of early warning measures, preventive diplomacy and peace-building efforts. It was the military's task to help implement the political strategies and agreements, for instance by collecting illicit weapons under the OFA. Macedonia thus demonstrated that international military interventions may not be necessary when conflict prevention works properly. In the case of Macedonia, the international community created a concept of cooperative security, with less reliance on military components, which the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had been trying to develop for many years. By contrast, the international involvement in the Balkans following the bloody dissolution of the former socialist Yugoslav Federation had mostly been directed at attaining military security in the conflicts and thereafter. In the following years, the concepts of conflict prevention and peace-building have thus attracted more and more attention.

The successful transatlantic cooperation in the case of Macedonia has finally allowed the international actors on the ground (EU, United States, NATO, OSCE and other international organisations) to better coordinate their efforts and thus to improve their cooperation.[9] Moreover, the peace process' obstacles could not have been overcome without a close cooperation of the Macedonian authorities with the international representatives in Skopje.

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8 See the contribution of Dusan Reljic in this volume for a broader perspective on the accession instruments vis-à-vis the Western Balkans.

9 Veton Latifi (2003): Macedonian Challenges in the Process of Democratization and Stabilization. KAS, Skopje. 2003, p. 230-231.

***The Problems: Reform Stagnation in the Implementation of the OFA and Dependency on External Pressure***

Despite the altogether positive role of the international community's engagement, the pitfalls on the road towards a multi-ethnic Macedonian state remain considerable. The OFA was and remains the only main guide for Macedonia toward multi-ethnic state-building. Nevertheless, within the last few years it has lost momentum and has had to be revised in some segments, especially due to the political "horse-trading" among the government and opposition parties and due to lack of the political will on the part of local authorities to foster the new reality contemplated by the OFA. In this way the process of multi-ethnic state-building in Macedonia began to lose its efficacy, and progress slowed. Several vital laws remain to be adopted and/or applied in practice, especially the OFA's laws relating to national-level usage of the languages of the respective communities – especially Albanian. Likewise, the country still awaits full implementation of proportional representation for Albanians in the public administration. This process is facing continuous difficulties and delays. Until the OFA is implemented in its original terms and on every institutional and political level, Macedonia will not reach its potential as a successful model of a multi-ethnic state-building.

Unfortunately, Macedonian politics and the political discourse in Macedonia are still dominated by interethnic competition on one hand, and inter-party feuds as well as non-democratic rivalries on the other. These conflicts marginalise the goal that should be the central concern for the Macedonian political scene and the political authorities: true multi-ethnic state-building. So far neither the multi-ethnic state-building process nor the EU integration process is immune to politicisation and inter-party feuds.

The EU integration process will be an important factor in helping Macedonia to build a multi-ethnic state via the requirement that Macedonian institutions meet EU standards. For those South Eastern European countries in transition, including Macedonia, the EU integration process seems to contribute to internal cohesion, system stabilisation and state-building. Although the two processes (approaching the EU and implementing OFA) are mutually supportive, there has been a worrying tendency in Macedonian politics to "play-off" OFA implementation against the wider reform agenda of the EU's long-term accession perspective. There is no doubt that the path towards EU accession and completing the process of the multi-ethnic state-building passes through the gate of the full OFA implementation. Yet, both processes should be dealt with separately as there is the danger for the Macedonian government to use the EU priority reforms as a vehicle to remove the full implementation of

the OFA from the agenda. Although the two processes are closely related, they are not identical. The EU, therefore, should forbear from privileging one process over the other.

Successive Macedonian governments have focussed exclusively on selected aspects of the EU reform agenda (e.g., economic reforms), but completely neglected or retarded other aspects which directly relate to the OFA (e.g., minority representation at the public administration, use of languages, etc.). In this way, Skopje essentially has declared Ohrid and multi-ethnic state-building "accomplished" and directed public attention to the wider requirements of the long-term integration into the EU. The problem is that, not unlike other multi-ethnic Balkan societies (Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.), the notion of multi-ethnic state-building in Macedonia is insufficiently promoted on both the national and local level. The only significant support for the process still comes from the international community rather than from national politicians, elites and the authorities themselves. The fact that multi-ethnic state-building and the EU reform process within the last few years are driven more by external pressure than by the will of the local people is putting Macedonian democracy at stake. If this situation persists, democracy will be more dependent on international institutions rather than on Macedonia's own state institutions and its civil society.

***Conclusions: Lessons to be drawn***

The case of Macedonia offers at least three important lessons for the international community as well as for the Macedonians themselves. First, the international community, and especially the EU, has learnt its lessons from the Bosnia and Kosovo experiences and was able to prevent Macedonia's inter-ethnic conflict from escalation into violence. The essence of these lessons is that inter-ethnic conflicts can be de-escalated through preventive engagement before widespread violence breaks out, if:

- The international involvement is launched early on in the very beginning of the developing crisis and includes long-term efforts of peace-building – which was not the case in Bosnia for instance;
- The diplomatic instruments include an intense international pressure applied within the framework of the peace-building efforts rather than using the military components outside of this framework;
- Transatlantic cooperation is conducted from the very beginning and without interruption. This includes a close cooperation on the level of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the U.S. government. In the case of Macedonia, this transatlantic cooperation also stretched to NATO and the OSCE.

The international community has intensively monitored and supported the implementation of agreed reform agendas in Macedonia and has linked this process to long-term efforts of multi-ethnic state-building. In the Macedonian case, the international engagement thus supports the peace process along two dimensions: preventing the re-escalation of the violence and making efforts in the long-term peace-building process. While the immediate focus was on the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement which halted the violence in 2001, later on efforts were undertaken for the stabilisation, democratisation and eventually the Europeanisation processes. The case of Macedonia proved that the effectiveness of preventive policy of the international community depends on a broad approach which integrates as many influential actors as possible. International non-governmental organisations, as well as local organisations, can play a decisive role in this process.

The second lesson is that the EU needs to carefully scrutinise its own diplomatic and political toolkit, especially with regard to the long-term accession perspective. The efforts of Macedonian domestic actors to "play-off" the full implementation of the OFA against the EU reform agenda leads to the conclusion that the EU should insist on the treatment of both processes as distinct but equally important. The EU therefore should insist on progress in multi-ethnic state-building while at the same time pushing forward the accession perspective for Macedonia in a wider context (including, for instance, economic and social elements). The instruments in this context thus need to be developed further in order to explicitly ensure that Macedonia will run both processes in parallel and without contradictions: the EU accession process and the OFA implementation.

Finally, the international community needs to strike a difficult balance between its further engagement in Macedonia, which remains necessary, on the one hand and the risks of sustaining purely external driven reform efforts in that country on the other. Peace-building requires a mobilisation of all parties involved in the process until the mission is completed. This means that the international community has to remain engaged in the consecutive process and must not leave the country alone to encounter the challenges. The costs of remaining engaged in this region are surely lower than to deal with the dire consequences in case of withdrawal.

At the same time, Macedonia's political class will have to show more initiative and political will of its own in dealing with the reform process. Internal actors and authorities need to

understand, and get clear messages, that the political reforms must become self-sustaining sooner or later. Otherwise, the reform process will turn out to be ineffective. This would, in turn, destroy one of the main preconditions for membership in the European Union: to contribute to the common European projects rather than consume the support and benefits of these projects all the time.

If the process of multi-ethnic state-building does not become "home-grown", it jeopardises the road of Macedonia towards the EU but also – and more fundamentally – towards a stable political and economic system within a unitary multi-ethnic Macedonian state. The alternatives to this scenario will be either a prolongation of Macedonia's stagnant transformation process or the abolishment of the unitary-state option. In the end, this would mean federation, "cantonisation" or - as the worst-case scenario - a division along ethnic lines. The recent history of the Western Balkans has shown that this is not a desirable outcome. Last but not least, the EU also needs Macedonia to succeed in multi-ethnic state-building in order to show that this concept can be made to work in multi-ethnic societies even when uneasy inter-ethnic relationships continue to exist.

# The Emerging Security Role: European Security and Defence Policy and the Western Balkans

*By Marco Overhaus*

## *Introduction*

The development of a common European policy in security and defence has been closely intertwined with the unfolding of violent conflicts and crises in the Western Balkans. On the one hand, these crises have created the necessity for the European Union (EU) "to do something" - and to do it by military means if need be - while the noble goal of peace and the ever closer integration in Europe was ridiculed only a few flight-hours away from Brussels. On the other hand, the Balkans became the real-world testing ground for the new concepts, structures and capabilities of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In other words: The Western Balkans was both the cradle and the catalyst of Europe's emerging security role.

One of the most complex and thus most challenging topics for the EU in this context is to become a "civil-military" actor in international conflict management policies and to develop its institutions and operations accordingly. To be sure, the EU does not have a lack of ambition here. In the European Security Strategy (ESS) of December 2003 the Union emphasizes to be a unique security actor which is distinct from other organisations and actors because of the range of civilian and military instruments it can bring to bear in a conflict situation. As is the case for ESDP more generally, real performance has lagged behind stated ambitions. Still, the increasing European role in state-building and post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans (especially Bosnia and Kosovo) has forced the EU to bridge this famous "capabilities-expectations gap" and to invent innovative solutions to improve the coherence of its operations and instruments. I will argue in this contribution that the EU has done so quite well - even without a Grand Design of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) but rather by way of limited institutional innovations, ad hoc structures "tailored to mission", and practical cooperation on the ground. The foreign and security policy provisions of the new Treaty of Lisbon are unlikely to change this pattern profoundly, even though they will bring some important changes on the "strategic" level in Brussels as well.

***Cradle and Catalyst:***

***Violent Conflict in the Western Balkans and the Development of ESDP***

The unfolding of violent crises in the disintegration of Yugoslavia was closely related to the conceptual, institutional and operational build-up of the ESDP. More than anything else, the experience of ineffective and powerless European crisis management in this region and the European frustration over American dominance led European policy-makers to rethink established security policies. Hence, in 1998 the looming crisis over Kosovo triggered the creation of "autonomous" military capacities and decision-making structures for the EU outside the NATO framework. This development resulted from a convergence of hitherto incompatible perspectives of the European Union either emancipating itself from American tutelage in the security and military sector (the traditional French view) or becoming a more capable and equitable partner of the US in European crisis management (the British view). The first phase from 1999 (with the EU summits in Cologne and Helsinki) until 2003 was dominated by the institutional set-up of decision-making and planning structures. In 2003, the ESDP entered its "operational" phase when it launched its first deployment ever – the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM).

Since then, the EU has broadened and refined its international security and defence engagements, both functionally and geographically. The Balkans has remained the crucial "testing ground" for this expanding security role. The first year of the operational phase in 2003 saw the deployment of four missions which together comprised some 2.500 personnel (military and civilian). EUPM in Bosnia was followed by the EU's first military operation, Concordia in Macedonia and Operation Proxima (Concordia's follow-up police mission). The fourth ESDP deployment in 2003 was also its first truly "autonomous" one: Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo included about 1.500 troops most of which came from France (as was true for the planning and command assets). Artemis was a crucial step for the ESDP development in at least one more respect as well: it opened a substantial security engagement of the EU in Africa (and especially in Congo).

In the following year, the European Union substantially upgraded its security profile in the Western Balkans when it took over NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. After some haggling across the Atlantic as well as among European allies over the "Berlin Plus" arrangements, which were supposed to grant the EU "assured" access to NATO planning and support, Operation EUFOR Althea was finally launched in December 2004. With initially 7.000 troops it became by far the largest as well as the most "robust" military ESDP

operation. The Balkans has clearly remained the focus of ESDP, even though it has subsequently extended its geographical reach to Africa (Artemis, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUSEC RD Congo, EU Support for AMIS in Sudan, EUFOR RD Congo), the Middle East (EU Just Lex for Iraq, EUPOl COPPS and EU BAM Rafah in the Gaza Strip) and – with the Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia and most recently the EUPOL Police Mission in Afghanistan – even to South- and Southeast Asia.

This short overview of ESDP deployments reveals that police missions, including the build-up, training and advising of local police forces in conflict zones, has become a crucial pillar of the European security profile. It is closely related to the wider ambition of the EU to develop civilian crisis management capabilities in parallel to its military toolkit, which was first spelled out during the EU summits in Helsinki (December 1999) and Feira (June 2000). Here, the EU defined four priority areas of civilian capabilities: civil protection, rule of law, civilian administration and infrastructure as well as police missions. In this context, member states pledged to provide up to 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts as well as up to 5000 police officers for ESDP missions by 2003 (a target which has been met on paper but not yet in the reality of deployments).

While the EU has thus created military *and* civilian assets since 1999, it has only recently begun to deploy them jointly into conflict areas and to develop the necessary concepts for this. Moreover, the EU has so far only mandated parallel missions, such as EUPM and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia, which were coordinated, rather than integrated. The next step would be to deploy civilian and military elements under a single mandate and chain of command in order to cover the full spectrum of tasks in the conflict cycle from conflict prevention to post-conflict reconstruction. The European Union has called its missions to support the United Nations in Sudan and to monitor the peace accord in Aceh its first official "civil-military" operations. Yet these have either consisted of military personnel performing civilian tasks or were rather modest in scope. So again, the real testing ground for civil-military integration will be in the Balkans: in Bosnia and Kosovo.

***The Concept of Civil-Military Coordination and the Ambitions of the EU***

Unlike the doctrinal concept of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in the NATO context, Civil-Military Co-Ordination (CMCO) in the EU is a rather broad political notion which comprises several aspects. Most importantly, it "addresses the need for effective coordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent

implementation of the EU's response to the crisis."[10] Though it is thus primarily an internal function to the Union, it also covers the relationships of these actors with external organisations and players throughout all phases of the conflict cycle from prevention to post-conflict reconstruction.

There is no single conceptual document which would represent "European-style" CMCO, but the European Union has nonetheless developed some approaches since the beginning of the operational phase of ESDP.[11] For instance, the Council and its Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is responsible for the overall political-strategic direction of any European crisis management operation, in February 2003 reviewed „Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management" which "have been drawn up to include crises of the highest degree of complexity".[12] This document outlines some generic procedures for decision-making, coordination and implementation of civilian and military instruments in crisis management (covering the relevant EU actors and conflict phases). It was created as a "living document" in order to take into account the lessons learned from the field operations. The Council document "Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)" of November 2003 is the result of joint deliberations of the Council and the European Commission. By stressing the "need for a culture of coordination" it adds another important dimension of CMCO which goes beyond formal and procedural aspects of CMCO.[13] The "culture of coordination" refers to the intrinsic willingness of the involved people to better cooperate within the framework of existing institutions. Finally the "Civilian Headline Goals 2008" of December 2004 deal with the capabilities-side of the concept.[14] By adding civilian assets to the crisis management equation it further spells out CMCO on the operational level. More specifically, the document points out that civilian crisis management may be deployed in a "non-benign" environment which in turn implies the need to integrate logistical and military protection (and thus CMCO).[15] Finally, the Civilian Headline Goal explicitly mentions new sorts of operations which lie at the civil-military intersection: security sector reform, support of disarmament and of demobilisation/reintegration. Subsequently, these conceptual

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10 Council of the European Union (2003): Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO), 14457/03. Brussels, November 7, 2003, p. 2.

11 Reinhardt, Markus (2006): Zivil-militärische Beziehungen im Rahmen der ESVP. Forschungsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Discussion Paper FG3-DP 05, Berlin, August 2006, p. 5.

12 Council of the European Union (2003): Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, 7116/03. Brussels, March 6, 2003.

13 Ebd. p. 2.

14 Council of the European Union (2004): Civilian Headline Goal 2008, 15863/04. Brussels, December 7, 2004.

15 Merlingen, Micheal/ Ostrauskaite, Rasa (2006): European Union Peacebuilding and Policing. Abingdon, p.46.

developments of the EU approach to CMCO have been further elaborated by the respective EU presidencies (especially by the successive presidencies of the UK, Austria and Finland in 2005).

The European Union has also begun to develop new and innovative structures in order to better carry out Civil-Military Coordination both on the political and on the operational level. On the political level, the Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIV-COM) was already created in May 2002 to span the first (Community) and second (intergovernmental) pillars. It thus is made up of representatives from member states and the European Commission. The so-called Crisis Response Coordination Teams are also supposed to serve a bridging function on the politico-strategic level in a given crisis situation. They are to engage all relevant actors in a particular crisis management situation. A crucial new institution in the CMCO-context is the Civil-Military Cell which was set up in the new Military Staff in the end of 2005. The Cell was a compromise between those EU members which in 2003, at the height of the transatlantic crisis over Iraq, sought to establish an EU Military Headquarter (Luxemburg, Belgium, France and Germany), and those governments which opposed the duplication of NATO structures (most notably the British). Though it is not a full-fledged military headquarter, the CivMil Cell is large enough to assist EU operations across the whole spectrum of military, civilian and civil-military measures. The cell shall also "be developed from the practical, formative experience in the development of ESDP, in particular in the Balkans, which underscored the importance of seeking synergies in civil-military interventions."[16] On the operational level, the EU Special Representatives (EUSR) have been strengthened politically in order to improve the coherence of the Union. Specifically, so-called "Coordination Groups" have been established to include all relevant actors in a given theatre under the chairmanship of the respective EUSR.

In sum, there is currently no ready-made CMCO-concept for the EU to take off the shelf and apply to different contexts and regions. All efforts to write such a concept with general principles for civil-military coordination and cooperation for the many diverse ESDP operations so far have failed.[17] Given the institutional character of the EU as a political entity *sui generis*, with a plurality of actors enviously guarding their competences, and in view of the specificity of each new ESDP endeavour, this might well turn out to be a mission

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[16] Quille, Gerrard et al (2006): Developing EU Civil Military Co-ordination: The Role of the new Civilian Military Cell. ISIS Europe and CeMiSS, Joint Report, Brussels, June 2006, p. 14.

[17] Reinhardt, Markus (2006): Zivil-militärische Beziehungen im Rahmen der ESVP. Forschungsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Discussion Paper FG3-DP 05, Berlin, August 2006, p. 13.

impossible anyhow. Still, the European Union has been able to develop practical and institutional solutions to enhance coherence on the ground, and those will be applicable to other contexts as well. This is especially true for the EU's engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

***Meeting the Reality Test: Europe's Civil-Military Engagement in Bosnia***

Bosnia and Herzegovina not only saw the first ESDP mission, it has since then also become the EU's most comprehensive and complex deployment of civilian and military means in crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. Yet when the European Union decided to take over much of the United Nation's responsibilities for post-conflict reconstruction and state-building in Bosnia, it shied away from a truly integrated approach under one single mandate (as was recommended by UNMIBH) and instead kept the civilian, police and military components of the EU presence in Bosnia separated in terms of mandates, chains of political control and reporting requirements.

In March 2002, the Council of the EU offered to replace the United Nation's International Police Task Force (IPTF) with the first-ever ESDP operation, namely the EU Police Mission (EUPM). Launched on January 1, 2003, EUPM comprised some 500 police officers (plus about 50 international administration officials and 300 local employees). Its principal tasks were to monitor, mentor and inspect the Bosnian police forces and to bring them in line with "European best practices". Compared to the previous IPTF, it had a less intrusive mandate in domestic Bosnian police affairs and focused more on the efforts to reform the police and develop local capacity and regional cooperation in police affairs. From January 1, 2006, the EU deployed a leaner ESDP follow-up mission (EUPM II) with less personnel and a refocused mandate which emphasized restructuring the police as well as helping Bosnian authorities to fight organized crime.

In the beginning, effective coordination of EUPM with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) of the international community as well as with the EU's first pillar instruments under the auspices of the European Commission was a key challenge. The OHR and the EU had both been important actors in the capacity and institution-building efforts in Justice and Home Affairs. Moreover, different competences as well as institutional cultures and interests made communication and information exchange between the Commission and the Council

structures responsible for the EUPM difficult.[18] In order to improve collaboration and coordination with other relevant actors in the areas of security sector and rule-of-law reforms in Bosnia, EUPM began to install liaison officers on various levels. Moreover, a coordination cell between the international community at large and the EU was also created in the summer of 2004. An important factor for the EU's overall coherence was the relationship between EUPM and the military EDSP-operation EUFOR Althea. To this end, the follow-on mission EUPM II was integrated more closely into the office of the EUSR and was also granted the lead role in police-related activities vis-à-vis Althea.[19]

EUFOR Althea became the ESDP's largest military operation when it took over from NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) on December 2, 2004. Just like SFOR, it was a "robust" military operation under Chapter VII of the UN Charta and also continued to perform the same fundamental tasks as its predecessor: Maintaining a "safe and secure environment" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ensuring the implementation by all sides of the Dayton/Paris Agreements and conducting "confidence patrolling" in remote or unsettled areas, collecting irregular weapons and supervising Bosnia's Armed Forces. While initially comprising about 7.000 international troops, the EU decided in February 2007 to reduce EUFOR's presence to about 2.500 troops due to the improved security situation in Bosnia.

EUFOR Althea has developed into a civil-military operation in two senses. First, it has increasingly assumed functions which go beyond SFOR's original mandate, especially in the area of combating organized crime. While the international military presence in Bosnia since Dayton has always had the task to support the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) - e.g. by detaining suspects – EUFOR Althea has also conducted operations to help the local law enforcement agencies disrupt illegal activities and fight the perpetrators of organized crime. In the words of its former Force Commander David Leakey, EUFOR's supporting of local police tasks "has been a major step forward for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and marks a distinction between the SFOR mandate (mainly military) and the 'new and distinct' mandate of EUFOR (which combines a robust military posture and extensive EU supporting tasks)."[20] The problem with this

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[18] Sandawi, Sammi (2007): Kohärentes Krisenmanagement? Die Operationen der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik auf dem Balkan und im Kosovo. In: Jopp, Mathias/ Schlotter, Peter (Eds.): Kollektive Außenpolitik – Die Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur, p. 130.

[19] Merlingen, Micheal/ Ostrauskaite, Rasa (2006): European Union Peacebuilding and Policing. Abingdon, p.78.

[20] Leakey, David (2006): ESDP and Civil/Military Cooperation: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005. In: Deighton, Anne/ Mauer, Victor (Eds.): Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy. Zuercher Beitraege zur Sicherheitspolitik, 77, Zurich, p. 63.

expanded civil-military agenda was that it was difficult to support for some member states, such as Germany, which traditionally maintain a clear separation between military and police tasks at home. Moreover, it made the proper coordination between the EUPM and Althea even more urgent. EUFOR Althea has also developed into a civil-military operation in the sense that its assets - such as engineers and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) experts - have increasingly been used to implement "high value" projects under the Commission's CARDS-program (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans).

The experience with the EU's overall presence in Bosnia shows that the Union has not yet been able to develop a truly integrated civil-military operation even in a conflict zone where it has invested considerable resources. One might even question whether the EU will ever be able to fully implement the CMCO ideal as long as institutional compartmentalisation in Brussels remains in place. While the operations in Bosnia (EUFOR, EUPM and EUMM) will remain distinct in the foreseeable future, the EU has nonetheless learned from past experience and introduced new practices and institutions tailored to mission in Bosnia in order to improve information exchanges, mutual consultations and coordination among the different EU actors and instruments. For instance, it was mainly due to practicing cooperation that Althea and EUPM began to cooperate more closely in Bosnia.[21] On the level of EU institutions in Brussels, too, there seems to have been an improvement to bring different resources and competences together in a concrete situation even when actually integra*ting* them would not be possible. One example is the European effort to support the creation of a federal Ministry for Domestic Security in Bosnia. According to Sammi Sandawi, it was the combination of political pressure by the EU representatives with the administrative advice by the EUPM and the financial support by the Commission via CARDS which made this a promising endeavour.[22]

On the institutional level, the Bosnian experience is likely to have a positive impact on the civil-military coherence of Europe's presence in other conflict-ridden regions. Bosnia hosts one of currently nine appointed Special Representatives (EUSRs) worldwide. His task is to function as a "lynchpin in the European Union's presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

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21 Merlingen, Micheal/ Ostrauskaite, Rasa (2006): European Union Peacebuilding and Policing. Abingdon, p.76.

22 Sandawi, Sammi (2007): Kohärentes Krisenmanagement? Die Operationen der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik auf dem Balkan und im Kosovo. In: Jopp, Mathias/ Schlotter, Peter (Eds.): Kollektive Außenpolitik – Die Europäische Union als internationaler Akteur, p. 131.

ensuring a coordinated and coherent EU approach".[23] In the context of the EU's comprehensive and deepening engagements in Bosnia, the EUSR has been given responsibilities across different areas of competences of the EU. Specifically, he may give advice on the constitutional reform-process, provide local political guidance to both EUFOR and EUPM, monitor rule-of-law activities, and engage with local Bosnian authorities. This strong political role is underpinned by his function as chairman of the regular meetings of all Heads of Mission, including the commanders of EUFOR as well as EUPM, EU Monitoring Missions and Commission representatives.[24] The gradual expansion of the EUSR's role in Bosnia in terms of institutional backup and policy substance has been a consequence of the progressive "Europeanisation" of crisis management and reconstruction efforts in Bosnia. It was further reinforced when the former "High Representative" for the international community, Paddy Ashdown, was also appointed EUSR. All in all this has significantly improved the "civil-civil" as well as the "civil-military" coherence of the EU presence in Bosnia. It is thus likely to be a model case for European crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction in other countries and regions as well.

***Conclusions and Outlook***

Since 2003, the European Security and Defence Policy has launched 19 civilian and military operations with a wide variety of tasks, sizes, geographical locations and duration. ESDP has thus become a very dynamic policy field of European politics. While the EU has never really adopted a "war fighting approach", its self-defined role as integrated civil-military crisis manager and actor of post-conflict reconstruction has become one of the principal challenges to the further development of ESDP. The exigencies and practical experiences in the Western Balkans have surely been instrumental in this respect. So far, the European Union has failed to develop a truly holistic approach to Civil-Military Coordination which could be applied "top down" to a variety of operations. This failure is partly owed to the persisting institutional rivalries, not least between the intergovernmental and community-based pillars of European foreign policy making. Nevertheless, the EU has been able to close the civil-military "expectations-capabilities gap" through limited institutional innovations, ad hoc structures "tailored to mission" and practical cooperation on the ground. The new Reform treaty of the EU is likely to give the coherence of Europe's security presence another boost, but much of

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[23] European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUSR Mandate, http://www.eusrbih.eu.

[24] Reinhardt, Markus (2006): Zivil-militärische Beziehungen im Rahmen der ESVP. Forschungsgruppe Sicherheitspolitik der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Discussion Paper FG3-DP 05, Berlin, August 2006, p. 6.

ESDP's dynamism will continue to be generated by practical solutions and operational coordination rather than from grand institutional design.

The next test case will once more be in the Balkans, when the EU takes over much of the international responsibility over Kosovo. The Council has already adopted the "Bosnia model" when it decided to make the EU Special Representative in Kosovo head of the new International Civilian Office (ICO) ("double-hat"). Like in Bosnia, the EU's overall engagement will effectively be split into several "presences" and missions with different mandates: an EU mission on the broader rule-of-law enforcement under ESDP, an enhanced presence of the European Commission, and the EUSR him/herself. It will also be shared with other international actors, most crucially NATO's ongoing military presence (Kosovo Force), but also with the OSCE, the World Bank and the United Nations, among others. The planned civilian ESDP rule-of-law and police operations will be the EU's largest ever, with some 1.800 international police officers, judges, prosecutors and customs officers. Once Kosovo's final status has been determined, the European Union will have a chance to test its civil-military structures and instruments in the Western Balkans once again.

## II. Book Review

### Schmidt, Siegmar/ Hellmann, Gunther/ Wolf, Reinhard (Eds.): Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007. (Schmidt, Siegmar/ Hellmann, Gunther/ Wolf, Reinhard (Eds.): Handbook on German Foreign Policy, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007.)

*Reviewed by Kirstin Hein*

”The aim of this handbook is to provide a comprehensive and knowledgeable overview of German foreign policy. Thereby, the focus lies on the representation and analysis of German foreign policy within the time period stretching from unification in 1990 to 2005.”
This is the claim of the editors Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, in the introduction of their “Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik“ *(*Handbook of German foreign policy*).* With this objective they wish to reach a broader audience which ranges from experts in science, politics and media, to university students as well as politically interested citizens. They hold that foreign policy is an “over centuries historically grown and therefore changeable practice of the political” which, for the respective state, is always designed “path dependently”. Thus, they do not only clarify the term foreign policy but also trace developments in foreign affairs (such as “Europeanisation”). In addition, they present the basic principles of German foreign policy since the foundation of the empire in 1871 in a highly compacted manner.

The handbook fills a tremendous gap for students of German foreign policy since their work has only one comparable forerunner – Hans-Peter Schwarz’s handbook which was already published in 1975. This by itself, even though not the only reason, surely makes this book a recommended buy.

As the authors declare in the introduction, the structure of the handbook underlies “neither an explicit, from the major theories (*Großtheorien*) of the branch International Relations derived, theoretical access, nor a specific approach of foreign policy research.” Hence, most authors offer historically thick descriptions. Theoretical developments are restricted to Dirk Peters’ comprehensive contribution at the end of the handbook. Peters gives an extensive view of the different theoretical and conceptual approaches used in foreign policy research over the last decade. In addition, Thomas Risse, Rainer Baumann, Hanns W. Maull and Michael Staack present four fairly prominent concepts German foreign policy analysis in more depth.

The major strength of the handbook is the convincing systematic structure in eight chapters: Following the introduction and the conceptual chapter, the remaining parts feature "framework conditions," "institutions and domestic actors", "states and regions", "policy fields" and "international organisations". The final chapter focuses on developments in foreign policy research. With altogether 62 individual contributions, which are arranged along the above-mentioned subject areas, the object of investigation is treated very comprehensively.

Most of the articles strike the right balance between general information and systematic analysis: In the chapter on states and regions, Heinz Kramer analyzes Germany's policy towards Turkey in a contribution that is systematically well structured. Addressing defence aid and alliance solidarity (*Verteidigungshilfe und Bündnissolidarität*), foreigners and migration policy as well as EC/EU policy, he covers, after a short historical introduction, the three main spheres of activity of Germany's policy towards this important country between Asia and Europe. The author systematically approaches his object of investigation from a pluralistic perspective, taking into consideration security policy considerations, EC/EU political interests, domestic factors as well as moral concepts, even though he does so without an explicit theoretical background. Sebastian Heilmann's clear, functionally structured and sharp presentation of Germany's China policy is also convincing. Udo Steinbach comprehensively presents major lines of development of the Federal Republic's foreign policy towards the Near and Middle East. By setting clear priorities, he manages to endow the reader with an understanding of the crucial sub-areas (Kuwait crisis, peace process, Iran and Afghanistan, Gulf states, Germany and the war against Iraq) in this context and in recent years. With their deep insight into particular fields of foreign policy, Kramer, Heilmann and Steinbach provide excellent examples of the potential of articles even in the narrow space of eleven or twelve pages.

Some contributions leave the reader with a comprehensive review of data, but little conceptual underpinning. In the case of Angela Stent's article on Germany's Russia Policy, the reader might find it difficult to systematically approach the topic since the author waived both a functional as well as a chronological structure. Moreover, Stent does indeed introduce the reader to political findings in the realm of German-Russian relations but sometimes misses to name causes and triggers of certain political developments.

Some topics are dealt with in a comprehensive manner, but the reader is kept guessing what the German impact in the policy area actually was. This shortcoming of the volume can be found in Jutta Bakonyi's und Cord Jakobeit's article on "International crime/ International terrorism". Detailed descriptions of the two phenomena as well as of their origins and developments supersede the description of the German policy in this problematic field. Moreover, the description of the fight against terrorism on the European level might have included clearer references to Germany than simply the statement that the Federal Republic functioned as a " 'motor of integration' in this policy area." In contrast, Wilhelm Knelangen's contribution to another recent volume on German foreign policy, edited by Thomas Jaeger, Alexander Hoese and Kai Oppermann, demonstrates how clearly the German impact in this policy area can be outlined. A more visible German reference is also missing in Bernhard May's elaborations on the G7/G8 group of industrialized nations which would be nicely placed in a handbook on International Relations. It can be assumed that the soft German reference can hardly meet the expectations of the target audience. (Though, in the case of May's contribution, this is may be attributed to the object of investigation itself).

Overall, the handbook is a very valuable tool for any student of German foreign policy. It is comprehensive, systematic and affordable. It can thus be considered to have a good cost/performance ratio. Regarding usability, the record of the handbook is rather mixed. In principal it is a good thing that the bibliographical references are commented at the end of each article. Fortunately, a large part of the comments are indeed informative to the reader. Sadly, websites on which the reader can access further information on the respective topics are recommended only occasionally. In the face of today's rapid caducity of information, it would have been reasonable to include the new media in a broader way. For a second edition of the volume, English language textbooks might serve as good examples of the benefits which corresponding websites can offer (see for instance, Jackson/Sørensen: Introduction to International relations). The extensive chronology of the most important foreign and world political events since 1989, which is included as an appendix, is very useful and therefore increases the value of the book further. Finally, the handbook features a precise index which also enables the reader to utilize this book properly.

## III. Online and Offline Resources Related to the Contributions

This section contains relevant documents and links to actors which our authors refer to in their respective contributions. The indicated internet sources (URLs) were checked on November 10, 2007. We do not claim to give a full compilation of all relevant sources on the issue at hand.

### *1. Official Resources and Documents*

Assemblee Nationale (2005): Constitution of 4 October 1958, Paris.
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/8ab.asp

Commission of the European Communities (2003): EU-Western Balkans Summit Declaration, Thessaloniki, June 21, 2003.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/thessaloniki_summit_en.htm

Commission of the European Communities (2005): Commission Opinion on the Application from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Membership of the European Union, Brussels, November 9, 2005.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0562en01.pdf

Commission of the European Communities (2006a): Croatia 2006 Progress Report, Brussels, November 8, 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/hr_sec_1385_en.pdf

Commission of the European Communities (2006b): The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress Report, Brussels, November 8, 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/fyrom_sec_1387_en.pdf

Commission of the European Communities (2006c): Albania 2006 Progress Report, Brussels, November 8, 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/al_sec_1383_en.pdf

Commission of the European Communities (2006d): Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report, Brussels, 8 November, 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/bih_sec_1384_en.pdf

Commission of the European Communities (2006e): Serbia Progress Report, Brussels, 8 November, 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/sr_sec_1389_en.pdf

Commission of the European Communities (2006f): Montenegro Progress Report, Brussels, 8 November, 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/mn_sec_1388_en.pdf

Commission of the European Communities (2006f): Kosovo Progress Report (under UNSCR 1244), Brussels, 8 November, 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/ks_sec_1386_en.pdf

Council of the European Union (2003): Civil Military Co-Ordination (CMCO), Brussels, November 7, 2003.
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/st14/st14457.en03.pdf

Council of the European Union (2004): Civilian Headline Goal 2008, Brussels, December 7, 2004.
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st15/st15863.en04.pdf

Council of the European Union (2006): Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Albania, of the Other Part, Brussels, May 22, 2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/albania/st08164.06_en.pdf

European Council (2000): Conclusion of the Presidency, Santa Maria da Feira, June 20, 2000.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fei1_en.htm

European Council (2006): Council Regulation Establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, Brussels, July 17, 2006.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_210/l_21020060731en00820093.pdf

European Union (2003): A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 12, 2003.
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/76255.pdf

Framework Agreement, Ohrid, August 13, 2001.
http://faq.macedonia.org/politics/framework_agreement.pdf

Stability Pact (1999): Sarajevo Summit Declaration, Sarajevo, July 30, 1999.
http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990730-sarajevo.asp

Stability Pact (2005a): Working Table I meeting, Final Remarks by Goran Svilanović, Sofia, May 17, 2005.
http://www.stabilitypact.org/rt/SOFIAWT%20I%20Conclusions.pdf

Stability Pact (2005b): Treaty Establishing the Energy Community, Athens, October 25, 2005.
http://www.stabilitypact.org/energy/Treaty.en05.pdf

Stability Pact (2006): Agreement on Amendment of and Accession to the Central European Free Trade Agreement, Bucharest, December 19, 2006.
http://www.stabilitypact.org/trade/CEFTAMAINTEXT2006.pdf

United Nations Security Council (1999): Resolution 1244, New York, June 10, 1999.
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United Nations Security Council (2007): Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future, New York, March 26, 2007.
http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf

### *2. Policy-Papers/ Analyses/ Media-Reports*

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International Commission on the Balkans (Hrsg.) (2005): The Balkan is Europe's Future, Sofia.
http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg.) (2002): Democracy, Security and Economic Development in Southeast Europe, Skopje.
http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_2162_1.pdf

Quille, Gerrard et al (2006), Developing EU Civil Military Co-ordination: The Role of the new Civilian Military Cell. ISIS Europe and CeMiSS, Joint Report, Brussels, June 2006.
http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/reports_10.pdf

### *3. Links to Relevant Actors on the Internet*

CARDS - Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financial_assistance/cards/index_en.htm

Council of the Baltic Sea States
http://www.cbss.st/

EUFOR
http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=27

European Commission
http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm

European Union Military Operation in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=594&lang=EN&mode=g

European Union Monitoring Mission
http://www.eumm.org/

European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
http://www.eupm.org/

European Neighbourhood Policy
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
http://www.un.org/icty/

Nordic Council/Norden
http://www.norden.org/start/start.asp

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
http://www.nato.int/

Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Hercegovina
http://www.ohr.int/

Ohrid Process on Border Managemnet and Security
http://www.stabilitypact.org/specials/030522-ohrid/index.asp

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
www.osce.org

Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation and Assistance Centre
http://www.racviac.org/index/Default.asp

Stabilisation and Association Process – Background Documents
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/sap_en.htm

Stabilisation Force
http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm

Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
http://www.stabilitypact.org/

Stability Pact Trade Working Group
http://www.stabilitypact.org/wt2/TradeWG.asp

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home

United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
http://www.unmikonline.org/

The World Bank
http://www.worldbank.org/

### *4. Selected New Publications on German Foreign Policy*

Abou-Taam, Marwan (2007): Deutsche Sicherheit im Spannungsfeld des internationalen Terrorismus und der Weltordnungspolitik. Gesellschaftspolitische Schriftenreihe der Begabtenförderung der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.; Bd. 1. Hamburg, Münster.

Abraham, Nils (2007): Die politische Auslandsarbeit der DDR in Schweden: zur public diplomacy der DDR gegenüber Schweden nach der diplomatischen Anerkennung (1972 – 1989). Nordische Geschichte; Bd. 6. Berlin, Münster.

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Adomeit, Hannes/ Gaddy, Clifford/ Himmelreich, Jörg/ McArdle Kelleher Catherine/ Kobrinskaya, Irina/ Milov, Vladimir (2007): The US-German-Russian Triangle: German-Russian Relations and the Impact on the Transatlantic Agenda. AICGS Working Paper. http://www.aicgs.org/documents/pubs/gmfrussia.wp07.pdf

Altrichter, Helmut (ed.) (2007): Adenauers Moskaubesuch 1955: eine Reise im internationalen Kontext. Rhöndorfer Gespräche; Bd. 22. Bonn.

Atilgan, Canan (2007): Die Kunst des Möglichen. Eine Bilanz der deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft. In: Die Politische Meinung 8/2007. http://www.kas.de//db_files/dokumente/die_politische_meinung/7_dokument_dok_pdf_11506_1.pdf?070807121806

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Bitter, Alexander (2007): Die Nato und die Raketenabwehr. Implikationen für Deutschland vor dem Gipfel in Bukarest 2008. SWP-Studie, 29/2007. http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/produkte/swp_studie.php?id=8269&PHPSESSID=4034ead6edff6fdbdc7c71d10abfc81f

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